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Abstract 
This reports the results of a follow-up experiment conducted to validate an earlier 
experiment showing that if taxpayers overestimate the prevalence of tax evasion, their 
compliance can be increased by informing them about the true rate of cheating. Tax 
compliance, therefore, is influenced partly by social conformity with perceived social 
norms. The experiments were done by the Minnesota Department of Revenue in 1995 
and 1996, but only the first experiment has been publicly reported to date (Coleman, 
1996).  
 
In 1995 the Minnesota Department of Revenue conducted several experiments to 
evaluate alternative strategies for increasing voluntary compliance with the individual 
income tax. The strategies included: (1) an increased examination and audit rate of tax 
returns with prior notice to taxpayers; (2) enhanced customer service; (3) redesign of the 
standard tax form; and (4) two types of letters mailed to taxpayers with messages on the 
importance of voluntary compliance. Each experiment involved a randomized design and 
selection of control and treatment groups. Because Minnesota’s income tax form starts 
directly from pertinent information on the federal income tax form, the experimental 
results apply to federal taxes as well as state taxes. Coleman (1996) reports the results of 
the experiments. One of the letter experiments has attracted significant attention in 
intervening years—the social norms letter, as it has been called. (See, among others, 
Kahan, 2001, 2002; Sunstein, 2001; Lederman, 2003). Because of the positive results of 
this part of the experiment, the Department of Revenue did a second randomized 
controlled experiment with this letter in 1996 to check on the validity of the first 
experiment. Before now, however, results of the experiment were never reported to the 
public. 
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In the initial experiment, the social norms letter had a small yet statistically significant 
effect on increasing the amount of income reported and taxes paid from 1994 to 1995 by 
those receiving the letter compared to their control group. The message in the letter was 
designed to correct the erroneous perception of many taxpayers that cheating on taxes is 
common. A telephone survey by the University of Minnesota in 1993, as reported in the 
St. Paul Pioneer Press (March 23, 1994), found that 27 percent of respondents estimated 
that over 50 percent of taxpayers underreported their income by $500 or more, while 
another 22 percent of respondents estimated that the percentage of tax cheaters was 
between 21 and 50 percent. These perceptions are much greater, however, than known 
rates of tax cheating. The key paragraph in the letter counters this misperception: 
 
According to a recent public opinion survey, many Minnesotans believe that other 
people routinely cheat on their taxes. This is not true, however. Audits by the 
Internal Revenue Service show that people who file tax returns report correctly 
and pay voluntarily 93 percent of the income taxes they owe. 
 
The expected effect of this message was that taxpayers reading it would learn that the 
social norm to pay taxes is stronger and more prevalent than they might have believed. 
Research on social conformity shows that people will tend to adjust their own behavior to 
a perceived social norm. As more people do a specific type of behavior, other people will 
be influenced to see that behavior as correct and follow along (see Coleman, 2007, for a 
review). The Australian National Office in conjunction with Australian National 
University has conducted like experiments on taxpayers with similar results (Wenzel, 
2001a and 2001b).  
 
Design and Results of the First Experiment 
 
In the initial experiment, the letter was mailed to about 20,000 people randomly selected 
from Minnesota tax filers in 1993 who were full-year residents and for whom federal tax 
data was available; amended returns were not included. A similar group of 20,000 tax 
filers was randomly selected to be the control group. After the experiment, the 
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differences in reported income and taxes paid from tax year 1993 to tax year 1994 were 
compared between the letter and control groups. The final numbers in each group were 
about 17,000 in each group, owing to loss of cases for various reasons such as failure to 
file by the date of the analysis (November 1995), moving out of state, death, incorrect 
social security numbers, and so forth. Furthermore, analysis was restricted to people 
whose filing status did not change over the two years. This eliminated the potential 
problem of how to account for differences in income when people married or divorced 
during the experiment.  
 
Statistical analysis using a nonparametric Wilcoxon2 test showed a statistically significant 
increase in federal taxable income in the letter group compared to the control group (p 
= .075),  as well as in total federal positive income (income before deductions) (p = .04), 
and state taxes owed (p = .06).  Dollar amounts were adjusted for inflation. A 
nonparametric test was used because parametric tests lacked power to detect or accurately 
estimate the changes, which were subject to quite a large variation in taxpayers’ incomes, 
with some having extreme increases or decreases. For example, the mean change in 
federal taxable income for the group receiving the letter was $2,390 but with a standard 
deviation of $79,182.  
 
Replication of the Experiment 
 
The positive results of the social norms experiment were somewhat unanticipated by the 
department but so noteworthy that it decided it would be worth the cost and effort to 
replicate the same letter experiment in the following year. Was the first result a statistical 
fluke or could it inform changes in compliance methods? The department was looking to 
increase voluntary compliance because appropriations for auditing were always limited, 
and auditing was an expensive way to achieve increased compliance. It also seemed 
likely that many taxpayers who underreport income would never be discovered by 
auditing, so other methods are needed to increase their compliance.  
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The research plan was to divide randomly the original control group into two groups: one 
to continue on as a control group, the other to receive the social norms letter for the 
experiment. In addition, half of the group who had received the first letter was randomly 
selected to receive the second letter as well. Thus there were now four research groups: 
the control group, a group that received the letter for the first time in the second 
experiment, a group that received the letter in the first experiment but no additional letter, 
and a group that received two letters. The four groups were about the same size. The 
focus of the experiment was on the first two groups, but the others offered some 
interesting possibilities to examine.  
 
The results of the second experiment confirmed the results of the first experiment. The 
letter had a modest positive effect on the group who received it compared to the control 
group. The size of the control group was 8,550 and the treatment group 8,537; again, 
those cases with a change in filing status were deleted. Adjusted for inflation, the median 
change in federal taxable income was $1,206 for the control group and $1,411 for the 
letter group; median changes in state taxes paid were $71 and $86, respectively. This may 
seem like a small gain, but one might compare it to the cost of sending out a letter—about 
$1.  
 
A nonparametric median test was used to test for statistically significant differences 
between the groups in the amount of change in the median from tax year 1994 to tax year 
1995. Statistical analysis confirmed that the letter group reported a greater increase in 
median federal taxable income than the control group (p = 0.008) and a greater increase 
in median state taxes paid (p = .0045).  A modest positive effect was also observed when 
comparing the control group to the group that got two letters, one in each experiment.  
 
A comparison of taxpayers who got two letters, one in each experiment, with those who 
received only the letter in the first experiment showed no statistically significant 
difference between the two groups along the same measures of income and taxes (median 
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test, p = .81). One might infer that a “reminder” letter in this situation did not further 
enhance compliance.  
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